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Abstract
Objectives Police legitimacy can hinge on what happens in police–civilian encounters,
yet much remains unknown about the socio-psychological processes involved in these
bilateral interactions, especially those affecting officers. We integrate insights from
policing research with theories and findings from scholarship on moral psychology,
interpersonal strain, and victimization fear to develop hypotheses about the situational
effects of civilian demeanor on officers’ cognitions (suspicion and perceived danger)
and emotions (anger, frustration, annoyance, and fear).
Methods We administered a series of three randomized vignettes involving routine police–
civilian encounters to 546 officers working in a large city in the southwesternUnited States.
We randomized civilian behavior—compliant, bad attitude (compliant but disrespectful), or
noncompliant—and the encounter type—offense-based versus dispatch-initiated.
Results Demeanor exerts a large causal effect on what officers think and feel in police–
civilian encounters. In each experiment, civilian hostility and disrespect increased
officers’ self-reported suspicion, perceived danger, and antagonistic emotions (anger,
frustration, and annoyance). In some cases, it also increased their fear.
Conclusions Each of these cognitions and emotions may separately influence police
decision-making, and each carries unique policy implications. Our results also suggest
the efficacy of experimental surveys to unpack the dynamics of police–civilian interactions.
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Introduction
In today’s society where policing is increasingly visible and salient (Weitzer 2015),
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what police officers do when faced with one of their most difficult and dangerous tasks:
interacting with civilians (Mazerolle et al. 2013; Tyler and Jackson 2014). The two
most important decisions in these interactions are connected (Reiss 1971; Sykes and
Clarke 1975). Civilians decide how they will behave toward police officers, and
officers decide how they will exercise their authority. After choosing to intervene
(e.g., make a traffic stop), officers choose how to handle the interaction as it unfolds,
and their choices can range from issuing a verbal warning to using deadly force.
Although many factors influence whether (and how) officers decide to invoke their
authority and take punitive actions (e.g., make an arrest), civilians’ demeanor appears to
be especially consequential (Mastrofski et al. 2002). When civilians are disrespectful or
hostile, it increases their likelihood of being ticketed (Worden and Shepard 1996),
arrested (Engel et al. 2010; Novak and Engel 2005), and subdued by force (Alpert and
Dunham 2004; Engel et al. 2000). Officers may also be less likely to use verbal de-
escalation tactics with civilians who are disrespectful or hostile (James et al. 2018).
One lingering question is whether these relationships occur because of the causal
effects of civilian demeanor, noncompliance, or both (Klinger 1994, 1996; Worden
et al. 1996). Demeanor is “legally permissible behavior of civilians during interactions
with police that indicates the degree of deference or respect they extend to involved
officers” (Klinger 1994: 477, emphasis in original), whereas noncompliance is a failure
to follow lawful orders (Engel et al. 2012), which itself may be a crime in many
jurisdictions. It is hard to identify the separate effects of demeanor and noncompliance
by observing actual police–civilian interactions for two reasons. First, we cannot
cleanly isolate the behavioral choices of each actor from the other or from the outcome
of the encounter. When interacting, officers and civilians continuously influence each
other, sometimes in subtle ways, and compliance decisions can be either a cause or an
effect of this dynamic interactive process (Reisig et al. 2004; Worden and McLean
2017). Second, demeanor is correlated with a host of variables—like race, criminal
context, and the neighborhood environment (Reisig et al. 2004; Smith and Alpert
2007)—that might also influence officers (Klinger 1994, 1996). And officers’
individual-level characteristics—their race, past experiences, etcetera—also affect
how they perceive civilians’ behavior and choose to exercise their discretion (Engel
et al. 2012). Unfortunately, most of the evidence for demeanor effects comes from
observational research (Black and Reiss 1970; Dunham and Alpert 2009; Lundman
1974; Piliavin and Briar 1964; Smith 1984), in which parsing out the effects of hostility
or disrespect versus noncompliance and other factors is exceedingly difficult and
requires strong modeling assumptions.1 A few experimental studies exist (e.g., Bennett
1976; Nix et al. 2019), but they have not separately manipulated demeanor and
compliance.
There is another lingering question, one that is elementary but fundamental: How
does demeanor impact officer decision-making? That is, what are the socio-
psychological effects of civilian disrespect on officers in encounters? When a civilian
has a bad attitude, does it signal pertinent information to the officers involved,
1 One principal assumption is that the model controls for all common causes of demeanor and the outcome
variable (e.g., arrest) (Klinger 1994). The problem in observational studies is that researchers can control only
for confounders that they know about and measure (Shadish et al. 2002). And even when all the relevant
variables are included in the model, confounding bias may still exist if there is any measurement error in those
control variables (Westfall and Yarkoni 2016).
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influencing what they think about the person—for example, that he or she is suspicious
or dangerous? Or does disrespect affect how the officers feel about the situation—their
level of frustration, anger, or fearfulness? Unfortunately, the available evidence pro-
vides few answers. Most prior research has focused on the outcomes of police–civilian
interactions—such as arrests or the use of force. As a consequence, what goes on in
officers’ heads when they encounter disrespectful and hostile civilians remains a black
box. Yet, knowing what officers think and feel in these situations is critical for
advancing theories of police decision-making and identifying effective policies for
improving how officers make decisions when interacting with civilians (Engel et al.
2012).
There are two reasons why the socio-psychological effects of demeanor on officers
have escaped empirical attention. The first is that our field lacks a theoretical frame-
work for studying demeanor that identifies those cognitions and emotions most theo-
retically germane to officer decision-making (Pickett and Nix 2019). The second reason
is methodological. Researchers examining the effects of demeanor on officers’ behavior
have come to rely on a method—systematic social observation—that is ill-suited for
measuring officers’ attitudes and emotions, limiting the scope of their analyses. We
address these issues in the current study. We theorize why and how demeanor affects
officers, assess the existing observational evidence for demeanor effects as well as its
limitations, and report new evidence from experiments that focused on officers’
attitudes and emotions, rather than behaviors. In the experiments, we randomized both
demeanor and compliance. The results show that independent of compliance, demeanor
exerts large causal effects on officers’ cognitions and emotions; it influences not just
what officers think but also how they feel when interacting with civilians.
Theorizing the situational and socio-psychological effects of demeanor
When questioned directly, police officers say they are more likely to arrest civilians
who have bad attitudes (Weisburd et al. 2000). This survey evidence is consistent with
the longstanding conclusion from ethnographic research that demeanor is central to
how officers decide to handle situations. In one of the earliest studies, William Westley
(1953, 1970) shed light on the importance officers place on being respected by civilians
and revealed that a significant portion—37% of those he asked, the modal response—
believed the appropriate response to those who are disrespectful is to use coercive
force. Brown (1988: 196) came to a similar conclusion about how officers respond
when civilians fail the “attitude test.” But separate from legal compliance, why would
demeanor be important to officers, and why might they want to respond coercively to
disrespectful civilians? There are several theoretical possibilities.
One possibility is that demeanor may affect officers’ cognitions (Bayley 1995; Toch
1996). When civilians are disrespectful or hostile, even if they comply with any initial
police orders, it may influence officers’ perceptions of their character or expectations
about what will happen next in encounters. A half century ago, Jerome Skolnick (1966:
41) observed, “the element of danger seems to make the police officer especially
attentive to signs indicating a potential for violence and lawbreaking.” Consequently,
he argued, police view civilian hostility as a danger signifier, arousing their suspicion.
Likewise, Miller (2004: 36) argued that the police believe disrespectful civilians “pose
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a greater danger” to them; in the officer’s view, “an asshole who disrespects a cop is
capable of anything.” Theoretically, then, civilian disrespect and hostility should
increase suspicion and perceived risk among officers. In turn, an officer’s cognitive
assessment that a civilian is suspicious or dangerous may create a perceived need to
gain control over the situation quickly and decisively. Indeed, the “reactive hypothesis”
of danger perception theory emphasizes the importance of threat perceptions for
understanding officer decision-making. It holds that the prevailing level of perceived
risk among officers affects their use of force (Jacobs and O’Brien 1988; MacDonald
et al. 2001). Danger perception theory focuses on the sensitivity of threat perceptions to
extra-situational factors (e.g., local or national homicide rates), but demeanor may be a
situational cause of perceived risk.
If officers view civilian disrespect as a proxy for suspiciousness or dangerousness, it is
also possible that they will become more fearful when faced with disrespectful civilians
(Holmes and Smith 2012). Fear is an emotion that is distinct from one’s cognitive
assessment of risk (Ferraro 1995; Pickett et al. 2018a). Fear is a function of three types
of perceptions: risk (or likelihood), control, and severity (of outcomes) (Jackson 2011).
In other words, people are most fearful when they believe that some negative event, like
an attack or victimization, is likely to occur, that it is unpredictable or uncontrollable, and
that it will have severe consequences. Fear profoundly affects behavior (Pickett et al.
2018a; Warr 2009). Experiencing fear produces a strong motivation to take behavioral
steps to reduce risk, such as avoiding dangerous people or places (Jackson and Gray
2010). Yet, “police officers rarely have the option of fleeing danger—their job demands
that they confront society’s dangerous citizens” (Holmes and Smith 2012: 350). Conse-
quently, if officers experience situational fear in response to disrespectful civilians,
perhaps because disrespect creates a sense of unpredictability, it may provoke them to
take punitive actions to control encounters (Berkowitz 1993). Indeed, Holmes and Smith
(2012: 347) argue that, at least in high-crime areas of the community, fear is “always
relatively close to the surface, ready to take hold of a police officer’s conduct.”
Beyond perceived risk and fear, demeanor may also influence officer decision-
making through other channels. According to Reiss (1971: 136), demeanor is
imbued with moral significance, and officers experience “moral indignation …
from the failure of an offender to grant deference to police authority.” Becker
(1963) argued that officers view disrespectful civilians as morally deserving of
sanctions (see also Black’s 1976 discussion of “moral worthiness”). What makes
disrespectful behavior so consequential is that it “signifies defiance of the larger
social institutions the officer represents” (Miller 2004: 36). According to Bayley
(1995:101), officers view themselves as “the last best hope for order” in society,
and thus believe “people who treat them with disrespect constitute a serious threat
to order”; from the officers’ perspective, a bad attitude is a “symbolic attack on the
law itself.” Van Maanen (1978:316) made the same observation, noting that
officers believe much of their job involves dealing with “certifiable asshole(s)”
whose affronts, however subtle, officers take as an indication “that their position
and authority in the interaction are not being taken seriously.” He too emphasized
that because of the sense officers have of “their moral position and responsibility,”
they see disrespect as more than just an individual slight—to them it is “a
profaning of the social and legal system,” which they perceive as “a moral
transgression” (pp. 313–319).
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If officers view a bad attitude as a moral transgression, then they may experience
antagonistic emotions such as anger when interactingwith disrespectful civilians. A large
body of research in the field of moral psychology, using diverse methodologies, shows
that perceived moral violations trigger “moral outrage,” followed by an urge to punish
the violator (Darley 2009; Miller 2001). The strongest evidence comes from experimen-
tal games, wherein participants can win or lose money, and have opportunities to punish
transgressions (e.g., cheating, unfair offers) by other participants. Neurological imaging
suggests that participants experience antagonistic emotions in response to these trans-
gressions, as evidenced by activation of the bilateral anterior insula (Sanfey et al. 2003).
In turn, participants get satisfaction or even pleasure from punishing rule breakers, which
is shown by increased activity in the caudate nucleus (de Quervain et al. 2004). In fact,
even third-party participants who observe others playing experimental games have
shown a willingness to spend their own in-game earnings to experience the satisfaction
of punishing rule breakers (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Kahneman et al. 1986). Other
experimental evidence demonstrates that participants report feeling emotions like anger
in response to unpunished moral transgressions, but report few such emotions if the
offenders are punished (Pickett and Baker 2017). Although none of this research has
focused on police–civilian interactions, the findings nonetheless suggest that disrespect
could have similar effects on officers. Outright noncompliance should too, of course.
Finally, even lacking moral significance, civilian disrespect may provoke in officers
a range of negative emotions like anger, frustration, and annoyance merely because it
constitutes a type of interpersonal strain (Paoline and Gau 2018): the presentation of
“noxious or negatively valued stimuli” (Agnew 1992: 50). In fact, scholars have long
argued that cynical and authoritarian attitudes develop among officers as a cultural
adaptation to the strains associated with police work (Brown 1988; Paoline 2003,
2004), especially the strain of dealing with disrespectful and hostile civilians
(Skolnick 1966; Toch 1996; Wilson 1967). Paoline and Gau (2018) recently reported
observational evidence in support of this argument, finding that stress was associated
with increased adherence to the police subculture. Another recent observational study
found that a cumulative measure of organizational strain—the self-reported frequency
of experiencing different stressful events (e.g., “receiving negative comments from the
public,” “dealing with supervisors,” “working more than 40 hours per week”) during
the previous 6 months—was associated with higher levels of general anger among
officers while on duty (Bishopp et al. 2018: 7). However, civilian disrespect and
hostility is a type of strain that may also have situational effects, increasing officers’
anger and frustration toward specific civilians within individual encounters. We provide
the first test of this possibility in the current study.
Prior research on demeanor effects
Scholarship on demeanor has followed an unusual path: researchers first examined
demeanor effects on officer behavior, then later focused on how to conceptualize
demeanor, and only recently began testing causal mechanisms (Nix et al. 2017;
Pickett and Nix 2019). Studies looking at how demeanor affects officer behavior relied
mostly on data collected via systematic social observation, limiting their ability to
analyze attitudinal or emotional mechanisms. Their main finding was that officers are
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more likely to take punitive actions—such as ticketing, searching, arresting, or using
force—against civilians who are hostile or disrespectful (Lundman 1994, 1996; Piliavin
and Briar 1964). Some research also found that demeanor influences other. non-
punitive officer behaviors as well. Mastrofski et al. (2002), for example, reported that
officers were less likely to be respectful of civilians with bad attitudes. On the other
hand, Mastrofski et al. (2016: 132) examined the predictors of officers’ use of proce-
dural justice in encounters and found an “absence of significant effects for … displays
of citizen respect and disrespect.” But taken as a whole, the evidence to date appears to
suggest that officers treat people differently based, at least in part, on their demeanor.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the causal effects of
demeanor on the basis of this literature for six reasons (Klinger 1994). First, “observers’
characterizations of suspects’ demeanor are only as valid as the instructions given to
observers and the judgments that they make” (Worden et al. 1996: 329). The second
reason dovetails with the first: because the conceptualization of demeanor took a
backseat to research on it, many scholars have conflated hostile demeanor with criminal
offenses such as assaulting officers. The problem is that “demeanor is not regulated by
criminal statute”—a civilian has a bad demeanor if he or she is disrespectful or hostile
but “violates no laws” (Klinger 1994: 477–478). The third is reactivity; the presence of
observers may change the relationships of interest if it affects how officers respond to
civilians, and there is evidence that it does (Spano 2005, 2006).
A fourth reason is that researchers using observational data have often been unable
to establish the temporal order of events in police–civilian encounters (Klinger 1994,
1996). As Reiss (1971: 48) lamented, “it is difficult to determine whether an officer’s or
citizen’s behavior initiated the tone or action in the encounter.” And as Klinger (1994)
noted, in many observational studies, it is not even clear whether the observers
measured demeanor before or after an arrest. Fifth, any study of demeanor has to
control for all pre-interaction offenses as well as any relevant information the officers
may have about the suspect (e.g., whether the suspect has an outstanding warrant, is a
repeat offender) (Klinger 1994, 1996). Most prior studies either have not done this, or
have used only coarse measures of offending. Sixth, researchers must control for any
crimes (property, violent, or drug) committed (or discovered) during the encounter,
which is rarely possible with observational data.
Klinger (1994) addressed some but not all of these issues in his analysis of
observational data collected in Miami-Dade in the 1980s—wherein he measured
demeanor on a three-point ordinal scale that solely captured legal behaviors—and
found that the effect of demeanor on arrest was statistically nonsignificant upon
controlling for criminal behavior. Mastrofski et al. (1995) reached a similar conclusion
shortly thereafter in their 1992 study of police-citizen encounters in Richmond, VA: the
effect of legal resistance on officers’ decision to arrest was rendered nonsignificant
upon coding illegal resistance as a serious offense. Other researchers, responding to
Klinger’s (1994) criticisms, have reanalyzed previously used datasets using different
approaches in coding and analyzing the data. The new findings, according to these
scholars, suggested, “the conclusion that a hostile demeanor affects police behavior is
not contingent … on how demeanor is measured” (Worden and Shepard 1996: 99; see
also Lundman 1996). However, in his reanalysis, Klinger (1996: 72) found that only
one measure of demeanor, “extreme hostility,” had a significant effect on officers’
behavior, and he questioned the meaning of this effect, pointing out that it was delete-
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one sensitive (it hinged on a single observation) and possibly spurious (due to his
inability to control for “whether officers had knowledge that citizens were wanted for
crimes that preceded the … intervention”).
To say the least, then, observational evidence of demeanor effects remains
unconvincing to some scholars. Their skepticism is understandable. In research
using observational data, the difficulty of establishing the temporal sequence of
officer and civilian behaviors, of disentangling the effects of legal and illegal
behaviors, and of ruling out potential confounders raises concerns about the internal
validity of findings. For example, how do officers perceive a civilian action that
could be categorized as both disrespectful and noncompliant, versus one that is only
disrespectful? If a civilian is simultaneously disrespectful and noncompliant, and an
officer responds with some level of coercive force, was it the perceived lack of
respect or lack of compliance that sparked his response? Indeed, to assume post-hoc
“that officers interpret and act on such behavior only in terms of its illegality will
obscure rather than illuminate the causal mechanisms that we seek to understand”
(Worden et al. 1996: 327).
Perhaps most importantly, observational studies are limited in their ability to look
into the black box, to examine what officers are thinking and feeling during interactions
with civilians. As Worden et al. (1996: 330) explained, “progress may be made through
research that generates insights into how suspects’ demeanor is perceived and enters
into officers’ decision calculus.” But such research is not possible with the typical
approach of relying on data from observers. This is because cognitions and emotions,
unlike observable behaviors, are difficult to measure using systematic social
observation.
A more promising approach is to utilize experimental methods, which also make it
possible to address the other common limitations of demeanor research (see above).
Experimenters can control for pre-interaction and interaction phase crime by design,
isolate, and randomly manipulate variables of interest—enhancing internal validity and
strengthening causal inferences (Shadish et al. 2002)—and also measure officers’
thoughts and feelings. Unfortunately, experimental studies of the effects of civilian
demeanor are rare, and those that do exist have not separately manipulated civilian
disrespect and compliance. Indeed, to our knowledge, there are only three relevant
experimental studies, one dated—conducted over 40 years ago—and two recent.
However, none of the experiments examined officers’ emotions (e.g., anger, fear),
and only two explored their cognitions (e.g., perceived danger).
Bennett (1976) randomly flashed a life-size image of an “aggressive” or “passive”
individual on a screen to police officers, and found they perceived a greater threat to
their wellbeing when the individual looked aggressive. The problem is that appearance
on its own is an inadequate measure of demeanor. To officers, Westley (1970: 123)
explained, the disrespectful civilian is a “‘wise guy,’ the fellow who thinks he knows
more than [police] do, the fellow who talks back, the fellow who insults the policeman”
(emphasis added). Thus, while it is plausible that individuals can look disrespectful,
arguably more salient to officers is what they say and do.
In this vein, two recent experimental studies have used better measures of demeanor.
Nix et al. (2019: 1183) presented police officers from two agencies with text vignettes
that randomly assigned demeanor based on civilians’ actions (e.g., walking off) and
words (e.g., cussing), and found officers placed less importance on treating
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disrespectful civilians with procedural fairness. The authors additionally found that
officers perceived a greater likelihood of violence in interactions involving disrespect-
ful civilians. However, this study did not isolate compliance from demeanor, making it
unclear which of the two was responsible for the observed effects. James et al. (2018)
conducted an experimental test of the demeanor hypothesis by randomizing civilian
behavior in video simulations with 50 police officers. They focused on one behavioral
outcome: verbal de-escalation tactics. Their findings showed that officers were less
likely to use verbal de-escalation with confrontational on-screen civilians. However, the
evidence in this experiment could not speak to what the officers were thinking or
feeling when they encountered confrontational civilians or why they became disin-
clined to use verbal de-escalation. The important question that remains unanswered is:
What specific effects does civilian demeanor have on officers’ cognitions or emotions
that could lead to a disinclination to use verbal de-escalation, as well as any number of
other outcomes (e.g., use of force, arrest)?
The current study: peering into the black box of officer
decision-making
With regard to the role of demeanor in police–civilian interactions, what we know least
about is the key causal mechanisms—the myriad cognitive and emotional processes—
that drive officer decision-making. As Engel et al. (2012) emphasized, it is critical to
understand how officers perceive and react to different types of civilian behavior.
Therefore, in this study, we return to the basics, so to speak, focusing on the theoretical
fundamentals. We examine experimentally the effects of demeanor and noncompliance
on officers’ cognitions and emotions. We test the following four hypotheses:
H1: Disrespectful civilians will arouse greater suspicion among officers than respect-
ful civilians, independent of legal compliance.
H2: Independent of legal compliance, disrespectful civilians will evoke more antag-
onistic emotions (i.e., anger, annoyance, frustration) among officers than respectful
civilians.
H3: Officers will be more fearful of civilians who are disrespectful than those who
are respectful, independent of legal compliance.
H4: Relative to respectful civilians, officers will perceive a greater risk of danger
when dealing with disrespectful civilians, independent of legal compliance.
Methodology
Data
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a series of survey-based experiments with sworn
employees of an agency in a large city in the US southwest. At the time of the survey,
the agency was comprised of 1752 sworn law enforcement officers and approximately
900 support personnel. It has jurisdiction over one of the 100 most populous cities in
the USA—with a population of over 250,000 according to 2016 American Community
Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates. The city is also rapidly growing: its population
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increased by approximately 17% from 2010 to 2016.2 Sixty-eight percent of residents
are white, 8% are black, 6% are Asian, and the remainder belong to some other race.
One-third of the population is of Hispanic or Latino decent. According to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report, the overall violent crime rate in the
metropolitan statistical area increased slightly from 2014 to 2016, whereas the property
crime rate declined.
In choosing an appropriate sampling design and survey mode, we took into account
two important and related concerns that arise when surveying police officers: social
desirability bias and the necessity of anonymity (Skogan 2015). “Police [are] a
suspicious bunch,” Skogan (2015: 112) explained, and in in-person interviews, “some
[are] certain to fear that ‘calls’ would be made to discuss their answers with ‘higher-
ups.’” In fact, of all survey modes, in-person surveys with interviewers produce the
highest level of social desirability bias (Tourangeau and Yan 2007). Computerized self-
administered surveys yield the lowest (Tourangeau et al. 2013). Therefore, we used the
latter mode.
In January 2018, we invited all 1752 sworn employees to participate in an anony-
mous online survey. An executive lieutenant sent two initial email invitations on our
behalf: one to command staff and the other to all of the sergeants. The lieutenant’s
email included a brief description of the survey (i.e., it was being conducted by
academic researchers; respondents would be asked to imagine a variety of scenarios
and answer questions about how they would feel in each), a web link, and in the case of
the email to the sergeants, a request that they invite their subordinates to participate. No
incentives were offered for participation due to the difficulty of delivering incentives in
anonymous email surveys (Tourangeau et al. 2013). Following Dillman et al.’s (2014)
recommendations for fielding online surveys, we sent three reminder emails over the
next 2 weeks, with the data collection period ending in early February. The research
protocol was approved by the first author’s Institutional Review Board.
Although social desirability bias is lowest in computerized self-administered sur-
veys, so too are response rates (Tourangeau et al. 2013). Add to this the large decline in
response rates to police surveys over the past decade (Nix et al. 2019), and it is easy to
see why computerized surveys of police officers have tended to obtain very low
response rates: 20% (Nix and Pickett 2017), 21% (Donner et al. 2016), 25% (Skogan
2015), 28% (Reynolds and Helfers 2017), and “just over 30%” (Bradford and Quinton
2014: 1032). Similar to this literature, 546 out of the 1752 officers invited to participate
in our survey did so, resulting in a 31% response rate. However, we are not especially
concerned about nonresponse bias, for three reasons. First, the sample demographics
closely resemble those of the agency: 90% of respondents were male (vs. 90% of the
agency), 67% of respondents were white non-Hispanics (vs. 69% of the agency), 17%
were 50 years old or older (vs. 14% of the agency), 44% were in their 40s (vs. 40% of
2 One advantage of analyzing demeanor effects among officers working in a large city is that there are likely
greater opportunities for demeanor to shape police–civilian interactions in such locales than in other areas.
Nearly a third of all Americans live in cities with populations of at least 100,000, and over 40% of all serious
(index) crimes occur in these cities. Officers may be less likely to know the civilians with whom they interact
in large diverse cities than in smaller suburban or rural areas (Decker 1979; Reiss 1971; Weisheit et al. 1994).
Furthermore, police use of less lethal force occurs significantly more often during police–civilian interactions
involving urban residents, compared to those involving residents of suburban or rural areas (Hyland et al.
2015).
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the agency), 32% were in their 30s (vs. 36% of the agency), and 7% of the sample was
in their 20s (vs. 11% of the agency).3 Second, our study is experimental, and random
assignment to conditions controls for selection bias as a threat to the internal validity of
findings (Shadish et al. 2002).4 Third, meta-analytic evidence shows that “response
rates are a poor indicator of nonresponse bias” (Peytchev 2013: 90), explaining just 4%
to 8% of the variation in bias in survey estimates (Pickett et al. 2018b).
Experimental procedures
To test whether civilian demeanor has causal effects on officers’ cognitions and
emotions, we relied on a staple method for analyzing judgment and decision-making:
experimental vignettes describing hypothetical scenarios (Mutz 2011; Thaler 2015).
Recognizing the advantages of such vignettes for making causal inferences,
scholars increasingly are using them to study policing issues, including civilians’
cognitive and emotional reactions to police procedural justice (Barkworth and
Murphy 2015; Reisig et al. 2018), and police officers’ reactions to civilians (Nix
et al. 2017). Responses to hypothetical vignettes have been shown to have construct,
concurrent, and predictive validity (Hainmueller et al. 2015; Pogarsky 2004). For
this reason, they are frequently used in social science research across disciplines to
study such diverse topics as public views about court legitimacy (Gibson 2008),
moral outrage about crime (Carlsmith et al. 2002; Darley et al. 2000), and potential
offenders’ crime-related cognitions and emotions (McGloin and Thomas 2016;
Pickett et al. 2018a). In a seminal study, for example, Robinson et al. (2010, 2004)
explored the criminogenic effects of legal injustice by asking respondents to imagine
they lived in a “hypothetical criminal justice system” where punishments were either
just or unjust.
In addition to strengthening causal inferences, the use of experimental vignettes
helps to reduce social desirability bias (Auspurg and Hinz 2015). However, the method
assumes that respondents know how they would respond in situations. Given the
available evidence, this is a reasonable assumption (Hainmueller et al. 2015; Kim
and Hunter 1993; Pogarsky 2004). For example, the effects of procedural justice in
hypothetical scenarios (Barkworth and Murphy 2015) mirror those observed in real-
world experiments (Mazerolle et al. 2013). Similarly, in the case of emotions, research
shows that “people are skilled at predicting the valence of their future emotional
reactions [and] the specific kinds of emotional reactions they will have” (Wilson and
Gilbert 2003: 401).
One important consideration when developing hypothetical vignettes is to ensure
their realism (Aguinis and Bradley 2014; Auspurg and Hinz 2015). Therefore, we
consulted with several police officers to develop realistic vignettes (i.e., we had them
read over our vignettes and provide feedback which we used to make improvements as
necessary). Further, because prior research suggests that officers’ responses to citizens
vary depending on the type of encounter (e.g., traffic stop, suspicious person call)
3 These demographic characteristics also closely approximate national estimates (Reaves 2013).
4 Of course, random assignment cannot control for nonresponse as a threat to the external validity of results,
which would occur only if there is an interaction of selection with the causal effect (Shadish et al. 2002). We
revisit the issue of generalizability in the discussion section.
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(Mastrofski et al. 2016; Worden and McLean 2017), we developed experimental
vignettes for different types of police–civilian encounters. The first two experiments
described offense-based encounters, in which the officer observed first-hand a violation
(public order or traffic) while on patrol. A third experiment described a dispatch-
initiated encounter, in which the officer responded to a suspicious person call. In
designing the experiments, we made sure the sample size (n > 100) in each cell would
exceed the minimally acceptable cell size as recommended by experimental method-
ologists, and yield at least 80% statistical power to detect a medium size effect of
demeanor (Auspurg and Hinz 2015).
Experiments 1 and 2: offense-based encounters In the first two experiments, we asked
the officers to imagine they witnessed an offense while on patrol and then began
interacting with the offender(s). The first experiment involved a littering offense
coupled with a possible public order violation. Officers were randomly assigned to
read one of three vignettes, which varied only by civilian demeanor and compliance:
compliant, bad attitude, or noncompliant. Per the demeanor hypothesis, the bad attitude
condition is of key theoretical importance. An accurate test of the hypothesis requires
that the suspect in the bad attitude condition is hitherto compliant—complying with all
initial orders—but disrespectful and hostile toward the officer. Therefore, we stated
explicitly in the bad attitude scenario that the suspect complied with initial orders. The
text for this scenario was as follows:
One night while you are on patrol, you see two youngmen who appear to be drunk
stumbling down the street. One of the men throws what looks like a beer can on
the ground. You walk up and tell them to pick the can up. One of the men says
“What are you, the trash police? What the fuck!” But he does pick up the can.
Then, he looks back at you and asks “Happy Captain Planet?” They both laugh.
In this condition, the two young men are antagonistic and mock the officer, but
nonetheless comply with the officer’s command to pick up the litter. In the compliant
condition, the young men pick up the can as well, but they are also respectful. Finally,
in the noncompliant condition, the young men are disrespectful and refuse to pick up
the can (see Appendix A Table 4 for full text of each condition).
For the second experiment, we asked the officers to consider a routine traffic stop for
a speeding violation. Similar to before, we randomly assigned the officers to view one
of three vignettes that differed only by whether the driver was compliant, had a bad
attitude, or noncompliant. Again, the most important task was to separate demeanor
from noncompliance, and thus in the bad attitude condition, we stated explicitly that the
driver was hitherto compliant:
You pull someone over for driving 10 miles over the speed limit. When you
approach the driver’s window, he says, “I was going two fucking miles over the
speed limit. Don’t you have something better to do?” As you start to tell him how
fast he was going, he cuts you off and says, “I don’t even want to hear it.” You
ask him for his license and registration. He hands them to you and says “And you
wonder why everyone hates the police.”
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Here, the driver clearly has a bad attitude—cursing at, interrupting, and belittling the
officer—but importantly, he hands over his license and registration, thus initially
exhibiting compliance. The compliant driver was courteous and apologetic, saying
“Sure, Officer,” as he handed over his information. The noncompliant driver was
disrespectful and refused to provide his information, and subsequently refused to step
out of the vehicle when asked (see Appendix A Table 4).
Experiment 3: dispatch-initiated encounter Our third and final experiment differs
from the first two experiments in several ways, which allows us to assess the
robustness of findings from the first two experiments. Whereas experiments 1 and
2 involved encounters where the officer witnessed an offense, the third experiment
involves an encounter where the officer responds to a suspicious person call and has
no knowledge of whether the civilian has committed any offense. In the first two
experiments, we randomized the civilians’ demeanor, but nothing else. In the third
experiment, we also randomized the civilian’s race and gender, and the neighbor-
hood context. The purpose was to provide a robustness check against the possibility
of information leakage (or construct confounding), which would occur if the
officers use the information provided in the experimental vignettes to fill in missing
details, and then base their responses on the details they imputed (Dafoe et al.
2015). For example, if the officers associate bad attitudes with high-crime neigh-
borhoods (Holmes and Smith 2012; Smith and Alpert 2007), then what appears to
be an effect of demeanor in the bad attitude vignette might instead reflect an effect
of the presumed (but unstated) neighborhood context. To rule out this possibility,
the potentially relevant details are stated explicitly (and randomly varied) in the
third experiment.5 The bad attitude condition reads as follows:
While on patrol, you receive a suspicious person call. The dispatcher tells
you the suspect is a [white/black] [male/female] in [his/her] 20s, wearing
baggy jeans and a t-shirt. [He/she] is walking down the street and looking
into car windows in a [wealthy, low-crime/poor, high-crime] neighborhood
in [city blinded]. You arrive at the scene and identify the suspect. When you
approach [him/her], [he/she] seems uneasy and anxious. You ask for [his/her]
name and identification. [He/She] says “What the fuck, I didn’t do nothing!”
Then, [he/she] tells you [his/her] name and hands you identification. As you
begin to question [him/her], [he/she] answers your questions, but is disre-
spectful, loud, uses profanity, and calls you names.
Though the civilian protests being stopped and questioned, and is loud, profane,
and mocks the officer, s/he complies by providing identification and answering
the officer’s questions. The compliant civilian also does as the officer asks, but is
respectful and refers to the officer as sir/ma’am. The noncompliant civilian tells
5 We did not include these additional manipulations in experiments 1 and 2 out of concern that officers might
notice if the civilians’ race or gender varied from vignette to vignette. We were less concerned about the
officers noticing the variations in the civilians’ behavior because the overall nature of the interaction (e.g.,
traffic stop, suspicious person call) differed in each experiment, and the additional details in the third
experiment helped to further differentiate (add nuance) to that vignette.
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the officer to “go fuck yourself,” and refuses to provide any information (see
Appendix A Table 4).
Dependent variables
Immediately following each vignette, we included a series of questions meant to
capture officers’ cognitive and emotional reactions to the civilians in the scenarios.
Using these questions, we constructed four dependent variables.
Suspicion For each experiment, we asked officers, “How trusting or suspicious would
you be in this situation?”Theywere provided six Likert-type response categories: (1) very
trusting, (2) trusting, (3) somewhat trusting, (4) somewhat suspicious, (5) suspicious, or
(6) very suspicious. Responses were coded so that higher scores reflect greater suspicion.
Antagonistic emotions Following each experiment, we also asked officers to indicate the
extent that they would feel: angry, annoyed, or frustrated. For each emotion, respondents
could answer (1) not at all, (2) slightly, (3) moderately, or (4) extremely. Principal-factor
analyses suggested that for each experiment, responses to these three items loaded onto a
single factor with acceptable pattern loadings.6 As such, we averaged responses to the items
to generate mean scales (alpha = .88, .89, and .86, for each experiment, respectively).
Higher scores on the scales reflect more antagonistic emotional reactions on the part of
the officers.
Fear We also asked officers as part of each experiment to indicate, “how afraid or
unafraid you would be in this situation.” Available responses were (1) very afraid, (2)
afraid, (3) neither afraid nor unafraid, (4) unafraid, or (5) very unafraid. We reverse
coded responses to this question so that higher scores reflect greater emotional fear on
the part of the officers.
Perceived danger Finally, in Experiment #3, we included a fourth dependent variable:
perceived danger. Specifically, we asked respondents, “Based on your past experiences,
how likely or unlikely is it that as you continue to question this suspect he/she will at
some point become physically violent with you?” Response options were (1) very
likely, (2) likely, (3) neither likely nor unlikely, (4) unlikely, or (5) very unlikely. We
reverse coded responses to this question so that higher scores indicate greater perceived
dangerousness of the suspect. This measure provides another cognitive measure of
perceived risk (Ferraro 1995), in addition to the suspicion measure (see above).
Analytic strategy
We estimated linear regression models and, as recommended by experimental meth-
odologists, used randomization inference to conduct the hypothesis tests (Gerber and
6 Experiment 1 eigenvalue = 2.08, loadings .77 to .90; experiment 2 eigenvalue = 2.13, loadings .75 to .90;
experiment 3 eigenvalue = 1.95, loadings .70 to .87.
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Green 2012; Keele et al. 2012). Randomization inference is an exact test of the sharp
null hypothesis of no effect, which is based on the random assignment within the finite
sample, rather than on large sample theory. It requires no parametric distributional
assumptions, and is valid with non-normally distributed outcomes, in the presence of
outliers and high leverage, and with nonprobability samples, regardless of sample size
(Gerber and Green 2012).7
Our third experiment is a 3 (behavior) × 2 (race) × 2 (gender) × 2 (neighborhood)
factorial vignette, and thus we include each of the experimental manipulations as a
categorical variable in the regression models.8 Given that we test our hypotheses in
three experiments, the false positive rate is inflated. Accordingly, we use a Bonferroni-
corrected alpha of .0167 as the threshold for considering a finding statistically
significant.
Results
Before proceeding to the main statistical analysis, it is instructive to first explore
visually how the officers’ responses to each of the survey questions vary across the
three behavior conditions (compliant, bad attitude, and noncompliant) in each experi-
ment. The responses for each of our cognitive and emotional measures are depicted
graphically in Fig. 1. The first panel shows responses for experiment 1, the second for
experiment 2, and the bottom panel shows those for experiment 3. In Fig. 1, for visual
clarity, we collapse each measure into binary form, whereby 1 indicates an affirmative
response for experiencing the cognition or emotion (0 otherwise). The figure displays
the percentage of respondents who fall into the “1” category for each outcome, by
behavior condition across the experiments. Although the three antagonistic emotion
measures (anger, annoyance, frustration) are combined for the main analysis, we
evaluate them separately here.
The results in Fig. 1 are striking. First, inspection of the figure reveals that all of the
outcomes are lowest when the suspect is compliant and has a good attitude. Very few
officers report antagonistic emotions, fear, or perceived danger when the civilian is
compliant. And except in experiment 3, where the vignette describes a suspicious
person call, very few officers report being suspicious of compliant civilians.
Second, it is clear that when the civilian complies but has a bad attitude, all of the
outcomes increase, and this is consistent across all three experiments. With a disre-
spectful civilian, many officers indicate they would feel some level of suspicion (70–
97%), anger (17–37%), annoyance (62–85%), and frustration (36–64%). Some officers
even say they would be afraid or very afraid of the civilian (4–11%). In the third
experiment, 37% of officers feel the suspect with a bad attitude is potentially danger-
ous. It bears emphasizing that although the civilians in the bad attitude vignettes are
disrespectful and hostile, they have hitherto complied with all officer commands. This
serves as preliminary evidence that civilian demeanor has an effect on officers inde-
pendent of legal compliance.
7 For the randomization inference, we used the command “ritest” in Stata (Heß 2017).
8 Consistent with best practices for analyzing experimental data, we did not control for respondent character-
istics in our models, an approach that “can be badly flawed” (Berk et al. 2013: 170; see also Freedman 2008).
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Third, with one exception, all of the outcomes are highest when the civilian is
noncompliant. As would be expected, officers respond even more negatively to
noncompliant civilians than to those who are compliant but have bad attitudes,
suggesting that a refusal to follow lawful orders matters above and beyond failing the
attitude test. Next, we assess the statistical significance of these effects, starting with the
offense-based experiments.
Offense-based encounters (experiments 1 and 2)
The regression results for experiments 1 and 2 are shown in Table 1. Recall that our first
experiment involved a littering violation in the presence of the officer, and the second
experiment entailed a traffic stop. Models 1 and 4 in Table 1 show the results for the first
outcome, suspicion, in each experiment. In both experiments, relative to the compliant
(with a good attitude) condition, when the civilians are compliant but have bad attitudes
it significantly and substantially increases officers’ suspicion (b = .632 and 1.354,
p < .001, respectively). These effects are statistically significant using a Bonferroni-
corrected alpha of .0167 to account for multiple testing. The effects of outright non-
compliance are even larger than those of having a bad attitude. The civilians’ behavior
accounts for 45–65% of the variation in officers’ suspicion in experiments 1 and 2.
Models 2 and 5 in Table 1 show the regression results for the second outcome,
antagonistic emotions, for each offense-based experiment. As with the suspicion outcome,
the bad attitude manipulation has a profound effect on officers’ antagonistic emotions in
both experiments. Relative to encounters with compliant civilians with good attitudes,
officers experience much higher levels of anger, frustration, and annoyance when
interacting with compliant civilians who are disrespectful and hostile. These effects are
Table 1 Effects of demeanor and noncompliance in offense-based encounters
Experiment 1: Public Order Violation
Model 1: Suspicion Model 2: Antagonistic Emotions Model 3: Fear
Experimental manipulations b p value b p value b p value
Compliant (reference) – – – – – –
Bad attitude .632 .000 .366 .000 − .011 .929
Noncompliant 1.764 .000 .922 .000 .444 .000
R2 .451 .293 .062
N 460 460 459
Experiment 2: Traffic Stop
Model 4: Suspicion Model 5: Antagonistic Emotions Model 6: Fear
Experimental manipulations b p value b p value b p value
Compliant (reference) – – – – – –
Bad attitude 1.354 .000 .892 .000 .371 .000
Noncompliant 2.631 .000 1.274 .000 .798 .000
R2 .654 .397 .150
N 482 482 482
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown
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substantial and statistically significant (b = .366 and .892, p < .001, respectively), even
using a Bonferroni-corrected alpha of .0167 to account for multiple testing. Officers’
antagonistic emotions are much higher still when civilians are noncompliant than when
they are compliant. In both experiments, the civilians’ behavior accounts for a sizable
portion (29–40%) of the variation in officers’ antagonistic emotions.
Models 3 and 6 in Table 1 show the regression results for the third outcome, fear, for
each offense-based experiment. Here, the bad attitude manipulation only has a signif-
icant positive effect in the traffic stop (b = .371, p < .001), where officers report being
significantly more afraid on average when confronting a compliant civilian with a bad
attitude, relative to a compliant civilian with a good attitude. The effect of the bad
attitude manipulation is not significant and is in the wrong direction (b = − .011,
p = .929) in the littering vignette. However, in both experiments, civilian noncompli-
ance has a substantial and statistically significant positive effect on fear (b = .444 and
.798, p < .001, respectively). The civilians’ behavior in experiments 1 and 2 only
accounts for approximately 6–15% of the variation in officers’ emotional fear.
Dispatch-initiated encounter (experiment 3)
Table 2 presents the results of our third experiment, which involved the officer
responding to a suspicious person call. Recall that for this experiment we
Table 2 Effects of demeanor and noncompliance in a dispatch-initiated encounter










Experimental Manipulations b p value b p value b p value b p value
Civilian behavior – – – – – – – –
Compliant (reference) – – – – – – – –
Bad attitude .946 .000 .679 .000 .701 .000 .076 .385
Noncompliant 1.297 .000 1.184 .000 .790 .000 .227 .008
Civilian race – – – – – – – –
White (reference) – – – – – – – –
Black − .146 .058 .047 .547 − .062 .300 .079 .271
Civilian gender – – – – – – – –
Female (reference) – – – – – – – –
Male .115 .137 .211 .003 .041 .525 .150 .041
Neighborhood context – – – – – – – –
Wealthy, low-crime (reference) – – – – – – – –
Poor, high-crime .176 .023 .131 .084 .069 .267 .091 .214
R2 .338 .284 .251 .035
N 498 498 497 498
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown
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randomized suspect race, gender, and neighborhood context in addition to sus-
pect behavior. Model 1 displays the effects of these manipulations on the first
outcome, suspicion. Relative to encounters involving compliant suspects, officers
reported being significantly more suspicious of the suspect who had a bad
attitude (b = .946, p < .001). Similar to the previous experiments, officers reported
being even more suspicious of the noncompliant suspect (b = 1.297, p < .001).
Each of these effects remain statistically significant when using the Bonferroni-
corrected alpha of .0167. The model explained roughly one-third of the variance
in suspicion.
For the third experiment, we also included a second measure of respondents’
cognitions—perceived danger posed by the suspect at some point during the
encounter. The results are presented in Model 2 of Table 2. Officers were more
likely to perceive the suspect as dangerous if s/he had a bad attitude or was
outright noncompliant, relative to compliant. The effects were substantial and
statistically significant (b = .679 and 1.184, p < .001, respectively). Each of these
effects remain significant when using the Bonferroni-corrected alpha threshold.
Officers also perceived male suspects as more dangerous than females (b = .211,
p = .003). This is unsurprising given that males are far more likely than females to
assault and kill police officers, according to the FBI’s 2017 Law Enforcement
Officers Killed and Assaulted data.9 The model as a whole explains approximately
28% of the variance in officers’ cognitive assessment of the likelihood that the
suspect will at some point become physically combative.
In Model 3, we regressed our outcome antagonistic emotions onto each of the
experimental manipulations. Relative to encounters with compliant civilians who
had good attitudes, officers said they would experience much higher levels of
anger, frustration, and annoyance when faced with civilians who had bad attitudes
or were noncompliant. Again, the observed effects are substantial and significant
(b = .701 and .790, p < .001, respectively), even when using the Bonferroni-
corrected alpha threshold. Notably, neither the suspect’s race or gender, nor the
neighborhood context in which the encounter took place exerted any significant
effects. As a whole, the model accounted for roughly 25% of the variation in
officers’ antagonistic emotions.
Model 4 shows the effects of the experimental manipulations on our fourth
outcome, fear. In this instance, the effect of the bad attitude manipulation was
statistically nonsignificant (b = .076, p = .385). That is, in the suspicious person
encounter, officers were not significantly more fearful of suspects who had a bad
attitude, relative to suspects who were compliant. On the other hand, officers
were more fearful of noncompliant suspects, and the effect was significant, even
when using the Bonferroni correction (b = .227, p = .008). Together, the experi-
mental manipulations explained about 4% of the variation in officers’ fear. With
these results in mind, we now turn to a discussion of the theoretical and policy
implications of our study.
9 See https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2017/tables/table-42.xls.
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Conclusion
Why is it important to identify the specific socio-psychological effects of civilian
demeanor on police officers? Beyond the goal of theoretical development and accuracy,
there are several practical reasons. Perhaps the most significant is that different
cognitions and emotions will likely have different behavioral consequences. Suspicion,
for example, may lead officers to further question, search, or detain (e.g., momentarily
handcuff) civilians. Antagonistic emotions—such as anger, frustration, and
annoyance—might cause officers to disrespect civilians or respond to them more
punitively (e.g., arresting them or using coercive force). Fear and perceived danger
might increase the likelihood of use-of-force errors, such as mistaking a cell phone for a
handgun, or misinterpreting an innocuous movement as furtive, and shooting an
unarmed suspect (Sherman 2018). Additionally, the different cognitive and emotional
reaction officers have when confronting civilians with bad attitudes may be responsive
to different policies and types of training. For example, the interventions that are
effective for limiting antagonistic emotions may differ from those needed to reduce
overreactions resulting from fear.
Our findings provide the clearest and strongest evidence to date that indepen-
dent of legal compliance, demeanor influences the way officers think and feel in
police–civilian interactions (see Table 3 for a summary of findings). When
civilians have a bad attitude, officers are more likely to be suspicious, perceive
danger, and experience various antagonistic emotions such as anger, frustration,
and annoyance. These findings were consistent across three different experiments
involving routine police–civilian interactions. We observed in Experiment 3 that
these effects remained substantial and significant even when we provided officers




#2 Traffic stop #3 Suspicious
person
1. Disrespectful civilians will arouse greater
suspicion among officers than respectful
civilians, independent of legal compliance
Supported Supported Supported
2. Independent of legal compliance, disrespectful
civilians will evoke more antagonistic
emotions (i.e., anger, annoyance, frustration)
among officers than respectful civilians
Supported Supported Supported
3. Officers will be more fearful of civilians who
are disrespectful than those who are
respectful, independent of legal compliance
Not supported Supported Not supported
4. Relative to respectful civilians, officers will
perceive a greater risk of danger when dealing
with disrespectful civilians, independent of
legal compliance
N/a N/a Supported
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with additional (randomized) information about the civilian’s race and gender, as
well as the neighborhood context in which the encounter occurred. The results
with respect to fear were more complex, as we will discuss shortly. But in all
three experiments, officers reported being more fearful of civilians who were
noncompliant in addition to having a bad attitude. Collectively then, our findings
illuminate the importance of studying the situational effects of demeanor and
noncompliance on officers, and provide a framework for better understanding
police decision-making during interactions with civilians.
Let us consider the implications of our results separately for each of the
specific cognitions and emotions examined herein. Our findings with respect to
the effects of demeanor on officers’ antagonistic emotions suggest that agencies
should explore ways to offset the anger and frustration that may arise when
dealing with someone who is compliant but behaves like a “certifiable asshole”
(Van Maanen 1978: 229). Antagonistic emotions matter because they are likely
to foster various coping efforts, which may include aggressive behavioral adap-
tations, to relieve these emotions. Indeed, antagonistic emotions may explain the
findings in prior studies that officers dealing with disrespectful civilians are less
apt to de-escalate (James et al. 2018), and more likely to disrespect (Mastrofski
et al. 2002), use coercive force on (Engel et al. 2000; Garner et al. 2002), and
arrest civilians (Lundman 1996; Worden and Shepard 1996). From a general
strain perspective, these discretionary behaviors are likely coping mechanisms
used by officers in response to the anger and frustration they experience upon
being disrespected. This is problematic because the law does not regulate atti-
tudes; civilians have a right to be assholes—indeed, this is what distinguishes
demeanor conceptually from noncompliance (Klinger 1994).
Theoretically, officers should be less reliant on aggressive or punitive means for
adapting to the strain of dealing with civilians who have bad attitudes if alternative
forms of “conventional social support” are available (Agnew 1992: 72). Organi-
zational justice may be one form of conventional social support that increases
officers’ ability to respond prosocially, or at least non-punitively, to disrespectful
civilians. As James Q. Wilson (1967) observed over 50 years ago, agencies can
inspire morale among employees even in light of external influences, like civilian
disrespect, which they cannot control. One such way, he argued, was “careful
enforcement of internal regulations in a way that demonstrates that the leadership
stands behind the men without fear or favoritism” (p. 157). As but one example,
while dealing with hostile civilians who demand to speak with a supervisor or
threaten to file a complaint, officers who are confident their supervisors will treat
them fairly may feel less pressure to dole out “street-level justice” (Smith and
Visher 1981). One promising avenue for reducing the influence of antagonistic
emotions on police decision-making, then, is for agencies to strive to maintain an
organizationally fair work environment for their officers. Indeed, some research
suggests that officers who feel their supervisors are respectful, transparent, listen
to their concerns, and otherwise treat them fairly tend to be less cynical and
distressed, and in turn are less reliant on coercive force (Trinkner et al. 2016).
The evidence also suggests officers are less likely to engage in misconduct (Wolfe
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and Piquero 2011) and more committed to treating civilians respectfully (Bradford
and Quinton 2014; Tankebe 2014; Trinkner et al. 2016) when they believe their
agency treats them fairly. Given this work and our findings, the next step is for
future research to replicate our experiment and examine whether officers who
perceive greater organizational justice are less likely to report antagonistic emo-
tions in response to civilians with bad attitudes, and to allow such emotions to
influence their decisions about how to treat civilians.
Our findings also strongly support the contention that officers are more
suspicious of disrespectful than respectful civilians, ceteris paribus (Bayley
1995; Skolnick 1966). Theoretically, the representativeness heuristic, whereby
officers judge civilians’ proclivities based on how well their behavior resembles
that of the stereotypical criminal (see Tversky and Kahneman 1974), is likely at
the root of this effect. If the prototypical criminal in officers’ minds has a bad
attitude, then officers will judge civilians who have bad attitudes to have a high
probability of being criminal (Kahneman 2011). One problem with such heuristic
judgments is they result in an insensitivity both to the quality of relevant
evidence and to statistical base-rate information (Kahneman 2011), and can lead
to stereotype amplification, where real-world associations become exaggerated in
the minds of decision makers (Quillian and Pager 2010). Another problem is that
although disrespect on its own is not a criminal offense, if officers perceive that
it signifies a person is suspicious and potentially dangerous, they may nonethe-
less feel the need to gain control over the encounter. Thus, in even absent
antagonistic emotions, the effects of demeanor on suspicion might lead officers to
conduct searches or detain disrespectful individuals, sometimes under legally pre-
carious circumstances. The danger is that, as Crank (2014: 152) notes, “a well-
trained but distrustful officer who is convinced of someone’s guilt, erases the line
between unmasking guilt and creating it.” Some civilians, particularly those who
have not committed an offense, may become upset when an officer attempts to
search or momentarily handcuff them, and passively or actively resist, which in turn
increases the likelihood of coercive force being used (Bolger 2015).
Because suspicion is a predisposition that officers acquire via the socializa-
tion process (Skolnick 1966), the demeanor–suspicion relationship has training
implications. First, training emphasizing that bad attitudes violate no laws may
help to reduce officers’ reliance on the attitude test to judge civilian suspi-
ciousness and dangerousness. Such training may also have the added benefit of
helping to reduce antagonistic emotions by countering the view that a bad
attitude is a moral violation. Second, training exercises (e.g., simulations) meant
to hone officers’ perceptual skills—namely, their ability to establish probable
cause without pointing to someone’s bad attitude as evidence s/he is hiding
something—may be useful. At a minimum, increasing officers’ awareness of
their tendency to rely on demeanor as a heuristic to judge the suspiciousness
and dangerousness of civilians may help them avoid common judgmental biases
and improve decision-making accuracy.
With respect to fear, our findings were more complex. Only in one of the three
experiments—the traffic stop scenario—were officers significantly more fearful of the
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civilian with a bad attitude, relative to the compliant civilian. Yet, this effect was
statistically significant even using a Bonferroni-corrected alpha to account for the fact
that we tested the hypothesis three times. This suggests that the effect of civilian
demeanor on certain officer emotions, like fear, may vary by the type of encounter.
Consistent with this interpretation, the bad attitude manipulation failed to significantly
affect fear in the suspicious person experiment, despite exerting a large effect on
perceived danger. Recall that fear is a function not just of perceived risk but also of
perceived control or predictability (Jackson 2011). That civilian demeanor significantly
affected fear only in the traffic experiment is perhaps attributable to the uncertainty
involved in traffic stops (Bayley and Garofalo 1989). For example, in this scenario,
compared to the others, it would be more difficult for officers to discern if the driver has
a weapon hidden within reach (e.g., between the seats). Additionally, many of the
videos used to train officers about the dangers of interacting with civilians involve
traffic stops, such as the video of the shooting of Deputy Kyle Dinkheller in 1998 (Lake
2017).
Although in many situations fear is warranted and even advantageous, officers
who experience fear in response to civilians with bad attitudes may also be more
likely to escalate the situation (e.g., by taking an aggressive stance, or drawing
and pointing their firearm). Elevated fear may also be associated with perceptual
distortions (Klinger 2004; Klinger and Brunson 2009), which could result in
mistake-of-fact shootings (Sherman 2018). Periodic training exercises that require
officers to make quick decisions while in a state of heightened fear may improve
officer decision-making in real world encounters. More broadly, a better under-
standing of how civilian demeanor interacts with the situational context to
influence fear among officers is important for efforts to reduce overreactions
and mistakes that may result from increased fearfulness and that may be espe-
cially likely in certain environments.
Our study was the first to demonstrate the causal effects of civilian demeanor,
net of compliance, on officers’ cognitions and emotions. The next step for
researchers is to evaluate whether the cognitions and emotions examined herein
influence behavioral outcomes (e.g., search, arrest, use of force), while keeping
in mind the difficulties of establishing causality in mediation analysis, even in
experiments (Bullock et al. 2010). Studies are also needed that explore whether
situational effects, such as those observed here, have broader impacts—such as
increasing immersion into the police culture (Paoline and Gau 2018) or general
anger (Bishopp et al. 2018). As Toch (1996):107) points out, “incident-centered
approaches become person-centered approaches when one compiles incidents
over an officer’s career and sees the officer as a composite of the incidents in
which he or she has been involved.” In other words, to what extent does a single
encounter with a disrespectful civilian have the capacity to influence an officer’s
perception of civilians more broadly or adherence to different policing styles?
Before closing, a number of limitations of our study deserve mention, which
provide opportunities for future research. For starters, we sampled officers from a
single agency at one point in time, and only 31% of the sampled officers chose
to participate in our experiments. Although sample selection is not a threat to the
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internal validity of our findings, it would undermine their external validity if
(and only if) it interacted with the causal effects examined herein (Shadish et al.
2002). Thus, while we believe our findings will generalize to other agencies and
across time, it is possible that they will not, and future research is needed that
tests this possibility. Whenever possible, researchers should consider incentiviz-
ing their surveys in order to improve their response rate (Singer 2002). Re-
searchers might also consider administering their surveys in person to maximize
their response rate (Nix et al. 2017b), while keeping in mind this could result in
increased social desirability bias (Tourangeau and Yan 2007).
Our study also relied on a single method—hypothetical text vignettes—that
while commonly used for analyzing judgment and decision-making, is not
perfect. Experimental vignettes ensure causal ordering and enhance internal
validity, which is necessary to test the demeanor hypothesis, but they may not
evoke as strongly the cognitions and emotions officers would experience in real-
world interactions. Future studies should thus attempt to replicate our findings
using alternative methods—such as video simulations (e.g., James et al. 2018) or
role-playing exercises (e.g., Hine et al. 2018)—wherein civilians’ demeanor is
randomized and officers are immediately interviewed afterward about what they
were thinking and feeling. Such a methodology would permit researchers to draw
conclusions about the relationship between officers’ thoughts and feelings and
their behavioral responses. Similarly, while there is evidence that humans are
good at anticipating their emotional reactions (Wilson and Gilbert 2003), phys-
iological indicators of emotions would also be useful. Researchers might monitor
officers’ heart rates and alpha brain waves during simulations to provide a more
objective measure of their emotional responses and perceived threat (see, e.g.,
James et al. 2014). Given that many police–civilian interactions involve multiple
officers, such simulations could also involve a second officer who serves as
backup, which might reduce the primary officer’s fear or perceived danger. These
are just a few of many avenues future research on this topic could explore.
There is observational evidence dating as far back as the 1950s that what
civilians say and do while interacting with police officers influences their out-
comes. Our study contributes to this literature by providing experimental evidence
that independent of legal compliance, civilian disrespect has substantial causal
effects on officers’ cognitions and emotions. In our experiments, officers faced
with civilians who had bad attitudes grew more suspicious, perceived greater
danger, felt more antagonistic emotions, and in some circumstances became more
fearful. Continued exploration of these socio-psychological responses in officers
will help shed light on variation in officer behaviors when interacting with
civilians, as well as identify promising policy avenues for improving police
decision-making. Wilson (1967: 158) emphasized, “the fact that the police can
no longer take for granted that noncriminal citizens are also nonhostile citizens
may be the most important problem which even the most proficient department
must face.” We agree and hope our results spur on additional theoretical and
empirical work aimed at better understanding the effects of demeanor on police
decision-making.
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One night while you are on patrol, you see two young men who appear to be drunk stumbling down
the street. One of the men throws what looks like a beer can on the ground. You walk up and tell
them to pick the can up. One of the men says …
Compliant “Sure, officer” and picks up the can
Bad attitude “What are you, the trash police? What the fuck!” But he does pick up the can.
Then, he looks back at you and asks “Happy Captain Planet?” They both laugh.
Noncompliant “Fuck you,” and the other man flips you the bird. They keep walking without
picking up the can.
Experiment 2
Traffic stop
You pull someone over for driving 10 miles over the speed limit. When you approach the driver’s
window, he says …
Compliant “Officer, I think I was only going two miles over the speed limit.”You tell him how
fast he was driving. He says “sorry about that, I guess I did not realize how fast I
was going.” You ask him for his license and registration. He says “sure, officer,”
and hands them to you.
Bad Attitude “I was going two fucking miles over the speed limit. Do not you have something
better to do?”As you start to tell him how fast he was going, he cuts you off and
says, “I do not even want to hear it.” You ask him for his license and
registration. He hands them to you and says “And you wonder why everyone
hates the police.”
Noncompliant “I was going two fucking miles over the speed limit. Do not you have something
better to do?” You tell him how fast he was going, and ask for his license and
registration. He tells you to “go fuck yourself. I’m not giving you anything.”




While on patrol, you receive a suspicious person call. The dispatcher tells you the suspect is a
[white/black] [male/female] in his/her 20s, wearing baggy jeans and a t-shirt. He/she is walking
down the street and looking into car windows in a [wealthy, low-crime/poor, high-crime]
neighborhood in {city blinded}. You arrive at the scene and identify the suspect. When you
approach [him/her], [he/she] seems uneasy and anxious. You ask for [his/her] name and
identification. [He/She] says …
Compliant “Sure, officer,” tells you [his/her] name and hands you identification. As you begin
to question [him/her], [he/she] is compliant and respectful, and refers to you as
sir/ma’am.
Bad attitude “What the fuck, I did not do nothing!” Then, [he/she] tells you [his/her] name and
hands you identification. As you begin to question [him/her], [he/she] answers
your questions, but is disrespectful, loud, uses profanity, and calls you names.
Noncompliant “Go fuck yourself. I did not do nothing.” As you go to question [him/her] further,
[he/she] cuts you off and says, “You can stop that shit. I know my rights. I ain’t
saying dick to you.”
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